UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

IN RE: CITY OF DETROIT,

Docket No. 13-53846

MICHIGAN,

Detroit, Michigan

December 16, 2013

Debtor. . 10:02 a.m.

HEARING RE. APPLICATION TO EMPLOY LAZARD FRERES & CO., LLC, AS FINANCIAL ADVISOR FILED BY RETIREE COMMITTEE OFFICIAL COMMITTEE OF RETIREES

MOTION OF THE DETROIT RETIREMENT SYSTEMS TO CERTIFY THIS COURT'S ELIGIBILITY RULING FOR DIRECT APPEAL TO THE SIXTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS; MOTION REQUEST FOR CERTIFICATION FILED BY CREDITOR MICHIGAN COUNCIL 25 OF THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY & MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO AND SUB-CHAPTER 98, CITY OF DETROIT RETIREES; MOTION OF THE RETIREE ASSOCIATION PARTIES TO CERTIFY "OPINION REGARDING ELIGIBILITY" AND "ORDER FOR RELIEF UNDER CHAPTER 9 OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE" FOR DIRECT APPEAL TO THE COURT OF APPEALS FILED BY INTERESTED PARTIES DETROIT RETIRED CITY EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, SHIRLEY V. LIGHTSEY, RETIRED DETROIT POLICE AND FIRE FIGHTERS ASSOCIATION, DONALD TAYLOR, CREDITORS SHIRLEY V. LIGHTSEY, DONALD TAYLOR; MOTION OF THE OFFICIAL COMMITTEE OF RETIREES REQUEST FOR CERTIFICATION OF THE ELIGIBILITY DETERMINATION FOR DIRECT APPEAL TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. SECTION 158(D)(2) AND FEDERAL RULE OF BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURE RULE 8001(F) FILED BY RETIREE COMMITTEE OFFICIAL COMMITTEE OF RETIREES

MOTION OF THE DEBTOR, PURSUANT TO SECTIONS 105 AND 502 OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE, FOR ENTRY OF AN ORDER APPROVING ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES TO PROMOTE THE LIQUIDATION OF CERTAIN PRE-PETITION CLAIMS FILED BY DEBTOR IN POSSESSION, CITY OF DETROIT, MICHIGAN

BEFORE THE HONORABLE STEVEN W. RHODES UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT JUDGE

APPEARANCES:

For the Debtor:

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Jones Day

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For the Official Committee of

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For Retirement

Retirement System of the City of

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ment System of the City of Detroit:

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For the Detroit

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By: WILLIAM GOODMAN

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In pro per: JEFFREY SANDERS, Creditor

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Also Present: ANDREW YEARLEY

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Proceedings recorded by electronic sound recording, transcript produced by transcription service.

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THE CLERK: All rise. Court is in session. Please
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    be seated. Case Number 13-53846, City of Detroit, Michigan.
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             THE COURT: One moment, please. Good morning. Is
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     there any objection to hearing the Lazard application to
     employ first?
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             MR. ELLMAN: No objection, your Honor.
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             THE COURT: All right. Then let's begin with that.
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             MR. MONTGOMERY: Good morning, your Honor. Claude
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    Montgomery, Dentons US, LLP, for the Official Committee of
    Retirees. Per your request on an order dated November 27 at
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     Docket Number 1854, you requested that a representative of
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    Lazard be here, and Mr. Andrew Yearley is in the courtroom,
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    your Honor.
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             THE COURT: Okay. Would you ask him to step
     forward?
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             MR. MONTGOMERY: Mr. Yearley, come forward. He is
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    not an attorney, so if you would like to put him in the
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    box --
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              THE COURT: Oh, no. That's all right. He can stand
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     right there at the lectern with you. What is your name, sir?
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             MR. YEARLEY: Andrew Yearley.
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             THE COURT: Would you spell that last name for us,
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    please?
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             MR. YEARLEY: Sure. Y-e-a-r-l-e-y.
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             THE COURT: And what is your position?
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MR. YEARLEY: I am a managing director in the restructuring practice at Lazard.

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THE COURT: Okay. And what is your assignment in connection with the City of Detroit case?

MR. YEARLEY: So myself and a team that works with me represent the Official Committee of Retirees as their financial advisor and investment banker.

THE COURT: Are you the head of this group?

MR. YEARLEY: I share the engagement with another senior partner, Ron Bloom, but, yes, the two of us are managing the assignment.

THE COURT: Okay. What's your fee?

MR. YEARLEY: It's a fixed monthly fee of \$175,000 a month plus reimbursable expenses.

THE COURT: So what will you and the other members of the firm assigned to this case do for \$175,000 a month?

MR. YEARLEY: So we've been working since early
September and essentially focused on four or five areas. The
first would be diligencing and analyzing the city's ten-year
financial forecast that reflects the cash flows that could
come out of the city over the next ten years. We obviously
are also looking at some of the key assets in the case,
whether that be Detroit Water and Sewer, Detroit art, land,
any other asset that potentially could be of value to the
creditors.

THE COURT: What does "looking at" mean?

MR. YEARLEY: So as an example, on Detroit Water and Sewer, we have a group of professionals that work alongside us at Lazard who are specialists in infrastructure assets, and so we've been taking the city's forecasts and numbers working across from Conway MacKenzie, E&Y, Miller Buckfire to sort of understand, as an example, that asset, its cash flows, its value, et cetera, so that would be one example, digging into the numbers, understanding the business model, understanding the various alternatives that could come out of Water and Sewer.

Similar sort of function on the city's cash flows, so looking in as much detail as possible into the operating forecasts of the city, its revenues, its expense base, its prospects going forward. Inclusive in that because it's included in the city's ten-year forecast is the reinvestment program, so how does the city intend to spend money and reinvest in the city, whether that be blight or otherwise, so understanding the basis of all that and giving our committee a view and an opinion on those forecasts.

THE COURT: And what are your qualifications to do this work?

MR. YEARLEY: So I've been at Lazard for 13 years in the restructuring practice. I have been in the restructuring world for over 20 years advising in both in-court and out-of-

court restructuring assignments. I lead our team in our New York office on the restructuring side and, again, have a long history with the folks that make up our team of representing distressed companies, creditors, et cetera.

THE COURT: Is this your first municipal case?

MR. YEARLEY: It is.

THE COURT: Are we paying for your learning curve?

MR. YEARLEY: No.

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THE COURT: How can you assure us of that?

MR. YEARLEY: I think many of the issues that the city faces are fundamentally issues that we see in the private sector, and so whether it's analyzing cash flows, business plans, assets -- there's obviously a municipal overlay here that makes this somewhat different, including the Chapter 9 filing. I also work with folks --

THE COURT: Well, I'll grant you that on the Detroit water side.

MR. YEARLEY: Um-hmm.

THE COURT: But the art issue is certainly unique to municipalities. Yes?

MR. YEARLEY: It is.

THE COURT: The quality of life issues that you say you're going to analyze are unique to municipalities. Yes?

MR. YEARLEY: They are.

THE COURT: What were you going to say when I

interrupted you?

MR. YEARLEY: So we have other professionals on the team as well who have worked extensively in sort of infrastructure assets or municipal-type work, so, as an example, we're currently doing work for the City of Philadelphia around their analysis around budgeting, privatization of assets, et cetera. Ron Bloom, who is my copartner on this, has a long history in dealing with both government and union matters. He's worked extensively with the steelworkers union, worked within the TARP program in government for the last four to five years before rejoining the firm, so we do have a wealth of knowledge within the team of these aspects of the case as well.

THE COURT: What cities has he worked on or with?

MR. YEARLEY: Well, he actually touched on Detroit
fairly extensively because, as the car czar, as he was so
named, in working with the restructurings of GM and Ford and
Chrysler, it was much --

THE COURT: I asked what municipalities he'd worked on.

MR. YEARLEY: He has not worked on a municipality.

THE COURT: How many hours a month does your engagement involve?

MR. YEARLEY: I can speak to the work we've done to date in terms of the hours, so in September and October we

billed a little short of a thousand hours. The month of
November is probably in the 400-hour neighborhood, so that's
the order of magnitude.

THE COURT: I asked you earlier about your fee. You told me 175,000 a month.

MR. YEARLEY: Correct.

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THE COURT: Wasn't there some other aspect of your fee? Help me recall.

MR. MONTGOMERY: You're talking about the transaction fee?

THE COURT: Yes. What is that fee?

MR. YEARLEY: So it's not determined. What we've included in our letter is the opportunity in the event there's an agreement between ourselves, the committee, and the city to pay a final transaction fee based on the outcome of the case.

THE COURT: Mr. Montgomery, given Sections 903 and 904 of the Bankruptcy Code, why is it appropriate for your experts to be looking into the city's decisions regarding its budgeting?

MR. MONTGOMERY: Your Honor, to the extent that that budgeting will form the basis of a plan which the city hopes to be consensual, our committee will have a view as to how that budgeting matches what they have learned from Lazard with respect to what is possible, and, therefore, it will

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know what choices the city is making and proposes to bargain
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     with the city over those choices. Obviously if the city
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     crams a plan down without the consent of the Retiree
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     Committee, it will do so based upon whatever cash flow
     forecasts and other asset utilizations it will describe to
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     the Court, but ultimately I think it is the notion, certainly
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     not the prediction, but the notion that the committee will be
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     a participant in a negotiated solution to the City of
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     Detroit's plan of arrangement.
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              THE COURT: I think our fee examiner, Mr. Fishman,
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    may be on the line. Mr. Fishman, are you there?
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              MR. FISHMAN: Yes, your Honor, I'm here.
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              THE COURT: Hold on. We're going to crank up your
     volume a little bit. Can you hear me okay?
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              MR. FISHMAN: I hear you just fine.
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              THE COURT: Do you have any questions for Mr.
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    Yearley?
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              MR. FISHMAN:
                            T do not.
                                       I have reviewed the order
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     that the parties negotiated, and I understand it, and it does
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     not, in my mind, pose any unique problems. And most of the
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     rest of what they're talking about are really substantive
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     issues as to which I'm not sure my opinion matters.
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              THE COURT: And the record reflect that the -- the
     terms of the employment have been agreed to by the city?
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MR. MONTGOMERY: They have, your Honor, and

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specifically there is a stipulation that appears at Docket 1832 that reflects that, including the doubly expressed caveat that the city has not consented to the transaction fee.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. If you have not already, I will authorize you to submit an order granting this motion through our order processing program. Chris, do we have that already, or do we need it again? I'm sorry?

THE CLERK: I don't see it here.

THE COURT: Okay. Will you do that for us?

MR. MONTGOMERY: We will resubmit the stipulation and formal order.

THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. MONTGOMERY: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you for coming today, sir.

MR. YEARLEY: Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay. One more moment, please. Okay. So it doesn't really matter to me which we do next. The next one on the list is the certification motion, and then we have the issue regarding the ADR procedures. Does anyone have any preference as to which order we proceed? No? All right.

22 | Well, then let's do certification first.

I guess my question for everyone who has a stake in the outcome of this is whether anyone objects to the Court's certification of the appeals of the eligibility order to the

Court of Appeals. No objection? Let me just ask you what procedural issues any of you see, if any, that might arise from the question about whether an eligibility order is a final order or not. I'm not asking you what your position is on the question of whether eligibility is a final order or not. I'm asking you what procedural issues might arise from that question arising.

MS. FENNING: If I may, your Honor, Lisa Fenning of Arnold & Porter appearing on behalf of the Retirement Systems. Since we filed the first motion, the other moving parties have agreed that I will respond first.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. FENNING: This may be a short hearing, based on your comment, but as far as the procedural issues are concerned, Rule 8003(d) should take care of any procedural question relating to whether it's final order or interlocutory order. As part of the amendments to two thousand -- enacted in 2005, the rule was intended to facilitate exactly this kind of a proceeding to jump over some of the procedural hoops to smooth the pathway, so in theory you do not have to file motion for leave to appeal to cover the base if it might be deemed interlocutory. The Court of Appeals has the jurisdiction under the amendments to 158 and this rule to decide that for itself. It can either deem it to be a motion for leave to appeal and grant the

certification as it chooses or it can treat it as a final order, so the procedural next step would be the motion to certify -- for leave to certify to the appellate court, and then they grant or they don't.

THE COURT: So you say "the next step." You mean the next step after this Court enters a certification?

MS. FENNING: Absolutely, your Honor, but you're talking about the procedural next step and whether there are any obstacles. There should not be. As to the scope of exactly what the Court of Appeals wants to hear, it will decide. The issue that goes up is the order. The order is two paragraphs, simple, straightforward, except for all the imbedded issues which resulted in the 143-page order, but the Court will determine that, and the Court can decide whether it's interlocutory or final, and it can choose to hear it regardless of which one it is.

THE COURT: Okay. In connection with a certification that this Court would enter, what kinds of supporting statements under the rule do I need to make, if any, or is it just simply a certification? I think I need to find that one of the statutory grounds is met; right?

MS. FENNING: Yes, your Honor, but it's --

THE COURT: What else?

MS. FENNING: It's been stipulated this is a matter of great public importance, which is --

1 THE COURT: Right.

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MS. FENNING: -- one of the grounds. It would be helpful if you would determine that this is a discrete issue that is -- that warrants expedited treatment on appeal because it could help resolve the issues in this case. We are going to be seeking expedited treatment in the Court of Appeals. If they are willing to go along with us, we would be seeking a briefing schedule that could conceivably, if everything fell into place, lead to a hearing and a decision as early as March or April. We would like to have a decision before confirmation.

THE COURT: What if I don't think that's in the best interest of the case?

MS. FENNING: I'm sorry.

THE COURT: What if I don't think that's in the best interest of the case?

MS. FENNING: You don't think that's in the best interest of the case to clarify the standards that should be applicable?

THE COURT: I'm only asking what if.

 $\mbox{\sc MS.}$ FENNING: What if? The certification rule is a mandatory rule.

THE COURT: Um-hmm.

MS. FENNING: If you do not think it's in the best interest of the case, the Court of Appeals or the District

Court could disagree and authorize that to proceed in any event. I mean I'm here as appellate counsel.

THE COURT: No, no. Don't misunderstand my question. It's clear enough I have to certify, so that part is beyond discussion or question here.

MS. FENNING: All right.

THE COURT: You raised the issue of me making a recommendation or a statement regarding expediting the appeal --

MS. FENNING: All right.

THE COURT: -- as if I agreed with that, and so my question was what if I don't agree that expediting the appeal is in the best interest of the case?

MS. FENNING: That would be a bit surprising to me in light of your handling of this matter. I mean it is ironic in some respects we've now caught up with San Bernardino even though it started more than a year earlier since they just granted certification last Friday. The hearings in this case have stressed the importance of expediting the decision. Your opinion stressed the importance of reaching this decision early, getting it resolved early. To be consistent with all of that, urging an expedited resolution to the Court of Appeals would be entirely in line with the handling of this case.

THE COURT: Well, but, again, we can talk about

whether it's appropriate to request an expedited hearing or not. That's not really my question at this moment. My question was if I don't agree that expediting the appeal is in the best interest of the case, should I say that in the certification?

MS. FENNING: Well, I suppose you could. I would ask that you not take that position, of course, but we would ask --

THE COURT: Well, let me just ask then the direct question. Why is expediting the appeal in the best interest of the case?

MS. FENNING: Because if we were able to get a decision from the Court of Appeal and if the Court of Appeals agreed with the objections to eligibility, particularly if the Court of Appeals agreed with the Retirement Systems' view that even if the case has -- case should go forward, it could not properly impair pensions, that directive would be available to inform the parties and the Court in the process of the confirmation of the plan and would avoid unnecessary proceedings in this Court going forward with a confirmation that could be reversed on appeal going back to the original eligibility finding. That would be my argument.

THE COURT: Well, the Court would either affirm or reverse the eligibility order; right?

MS. FENNING: The Court could do three things, in

our view. They could affirm, they could affirm with directions, or they could — they could reverse with directions, or they could just flat out reverse. From the Retirement Systems' viewpoint, it is possible — the middle ground would be allowing the case to proceed as eligible but directing that the pensions not be impaired, and if that directive came down because the Court of Appeals agreed with our position, then that would inform the process of negotiating and confirming a plan. If the Court of Appeals reversed, we've been retained to take it all the way to the Supreme Court, if necessary. I doubt we would get an answer from the Supreme Court within that time period, but we would hope that the Sixth Circuit would clarify the law.

THE COURT: To what extent should the Court inquire of you and/or the mediator regarding the status of mediation and take that into account in determining whether to suggest expedition to the Court of Appeals?

MS. FENNING: The Retirement Systems are participating actively in the mediation process and will continue to do so. This is a dual track process. Robert Gordon and Clark Hill will be continuing to move forward on the bankruptcy level. We'll be parallel tracking at the appellate level. We are not trying to slow down the confirmation process. We think the two things have to go in tandem. And I don't think it will adversely impact the

retirement -- the mediation process. The fact that the issue is undecided on appeal means that the parties can disagree about what the ultimate outcome will be, but that exists whether the appeal is fast or slow.

THE COURT: Thank you. Would anyone else like to be heard on any of the questions that I've asked?

MS. LEVINE: Good morning, your Honor. Sharon Levine, and I'm here with Phil Gross, Lowenstein Sandler. Thank you.

THE COURT: Mr. Gross.

MS. LEVINE: Your Honor, just addressing briefly the issue of expediting and whether or not it's in the best interest of the case or not, our view is slightly different than that previously expressed. From AFSCME's perspective, this is an issue of national importance. We're already seeing across the country the impact that the issue, especially with regard to the pensions, is having as we are having dialogues in other jurisdictions in Michigan and throughout the country. In addition to that, equally important, perhaps maybe even more important, is your Honor's ruling with regard to the need to engage in good faith negotiations before approaching a Chapter 9 setting, and so for us having those two issues on appeal and decided quickly could be useful. That is separate and apart from what's happening in Detroit, which is also important. As your Honor

may recall, we tried to negotiate prior to the bankruptcy. We actually didn't oppose the appointment of the Retiree Committee. Our response was directed towards actually getting a seat at that table and participating through that process. We gave your Honor comments with regard to the mediation order, which hopefully you found constructive, some of which we think you adopted. We've been actively participating in mediation. We hope to actively participate in negotiating a plan of adjustment. We're not saying that we should wait or stall because of an appeal, whether it goes fast or slow. Detroit has serious issues. We intend to fully engage to try and work through those problems, but we do think that having these issues certified and having them decided quickly here and more broadly would be constructive for everybody. Thank you.

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THE COURT: So your view is interesting. It holds that in deciding whether to expedite the Court of Appeals' consideration of these issues, the Court should take into account not just what's in the best interest of the case but also the public importance of the issues themselves.

MS. LEVINE: Yes, your Honor. And we think that that's imbedded in Chapter 9 itself, which recognizes in an eligibility decision there's not going to be a stay, but there is likely going to be an appeal, which is probably why they specifically addressed the fact that you're not going to

have a stay.

THE COURT: Um-hmm. Thank you.

MS. LEVINE: Thank you.

MR. MONTGOMERY: Your Honor, in response to your inquiry regarding expedition, we would -- the Retiree

Committee would support it because, as you said on page 38 of your opinion, resolution of the pension question is of utmost importance to confirmation or confirmability of a plan, and regardless of how the parties negotiate from now until the conclusion, we think that both the likelihood that the Sixth Circuit will make a decision soon and the reality, whichever it does, will help the resolution process. Our clients are narrowly focused on the harm done to them. There is public importance, but that's not really what worries them. They're really worried about the direct harm, and so they would urge, your Honor, that to the extent you're debating the question of whether or not expedition is helpful, they would request that you expedite.

THE COURT: You're not telling me that your position is to suspend mediation pending the appeal?

MR. MONTGOMERY: Absolutely not, your Honor.

THE COURT: Your client committed to proceeding full steam ahead on the mediation pending the appeal?

MR. MONTGOMERY: Absolutely. As you might expect, we have --

THE COURT: I accept your representation.

MR. MONTGOMERY: We have a different perspective on, you know, what's achievable and why, but, yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, okay.

MR. MONTGOMERY: Thank you.

MS. BALL: Good morning, your Honor. Corinne Ball of Jones Day for the city. Your Honor, I rise to address the question that you asked about procedure. We think it's clear that the order is interlocutory, so, your Honor, we think that places a burden on the Court to make a finding as to which it's a controlling question of law, there's substantial ground for difference of opinion, or that, third, which is an immediate appeal will materially advance the case clearly addressed to your discretion.

We also think that in terms of having the dual burden of certifying -- in addition to certifying an interlocutory order, that your Honor has to find and should find in order to do that that this case involves a matter of public importance and that, therefore, should go directly to the circuit.

We note, your Honor, that under the statute, under 158(d)(2)(D), proceedings before your Honor will continue during the pendency of the appeal even if you do certify, which I think answers some of the questions that you were discussing with Mr. Montgomery. While the city believes

proceeding with this appeal in the ordinary course is the right answer, if the Court wishes to certify because it is a matter of public importance, the city will consent to that certification, your Honor. If you have any questions, I would be happy to answer them.

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THE COURT: What's the city's position on whether the Court should recommend an expedited appeal or consideration by the Sixth Circuit?

MS. BALL: Your Honor, we are focused on proceeding with the case before you. If your Honor were to find that resolution of this appeal would materially advance the case, then expedition might be in order. On the other hand, your Honor, we are hopeful that we will continue discussing the issues that separate the movants this morning from the city throughout this period. As you know, the city is dedicated to proceeding as rapidly as possible with its plan moving towards a plan of adjustment that will hopefully have broad creditor support. That is our objective. Anything that detracts from that is not necessarily something we would support. However, your Honor, we understand the significance of the decision that your Honor rendered, the importance to the parties, and perhaps the law itself, so if your Honor were to certify, we would consent.

As to expedition, your Honor, we understand that -- we have looked into the rules before the Sixth Circuit.

They, unlike other circuits, do not have a weekly scheduled motion day to hear certification petitions like some other circuits. I think my colleague, Judge Fenning, has shared with your Honor that the time frame, even expedition, looks to us to be two to three months, in any event, longer if you don't, so perhaps expedition is -- expedition would be the only way to accomplish the movant's objective, but rest assured, your Honor, we will be moving ahead on pursuing restoring the city's viability and its plan.

THE COURT: Thank you. All right. The Court will enter an appropriate order certifying this matter to the Court of Appeals. I want to think a bit more on the issue of whether to say anything about whether the appeal should be expedited, but I'll do something in the next day or so.

And so now let's turn our attention to the other matter, which is the ADR procedures.

MR. ELLMAN: Thank you, your Honor. Jeffrey Ellman from Jones Day on behalf of the city. We have filed our ADR procedures motion in the spirit of, as we're talking about, moving the case along, and we are very anxious to begin this process. We filed the motion under 105 -- Sections 105 and 502. I'd be happy to provide some background and context to the process and a little bit of an overview of what we're trying to accomplish, not very lengthy, or we can just talk about the objections if the Court prefers.

THE COURT: Well, I've read everything, including your amended proposed order --

MR. ELLMAN: Okay.

THE COURT: -- so I'm much less interested in the history than I am in what discussions, if any, you've had since then and what objections are still outstanding.

MR. ELLMAN: That would be fine, your Honor. I can do that. I can report that we had six or I guess maybe seven filed objections, depending on how you count them, and four informal objections. I'd say the majority of them are resolved. We have four or five, depending on how you count them, that may be open and that may require the objecting parties to state where we stand. And I say six or seven filed objections or four or five resolved because there was a motion filed this morning. I don't know if your Honor has seen it.

THE COURT: I have.

MR. ELLMAN: I had not seen it before I got here before it was filed, and it was handed to me while you were -- when we were in court, so I know kind of what it says, but that hasn't obviously been addressed in any way, so let me tell you what we have resolved. Then we can talk about what's open.

THE COURT: Mr. Goodman, I will give you every opportunity to be heard, sir.

MR. GOODMAN: My only problem, your Honor, is that I can't hear very well. I can't hear Mr. Ellman.

THE COURT: Oh, well, then you may have a seat right there in the jury box and perhaps hear best.

MR. GOODMAN: Thank you, your Honor. I apologize.

MR. ELLMAN: Am I speaking well enough into the microphone?

THE COURT: For my purposes, yes.

MR. ELLMAN: Okay. Thank you. All right. Well, as far as the objections, your Honor, we --

THE COURT: Let's get Mr. Goodman situated, and then you can proceed. Okay. Let us know if we need to make any other adjustments here.

MR. GOODMAN: That's fine. This is fine. I just -THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead, sir.

MR. GOODMAN: -- have a bad ear, so to speak.

MR. ELLMAN: Well, your Honor, as you know from reading the procedures and certainly in light of the Court's concerns in this case, we designed the procedures primarily to address the tort and litigation claims, and we used the process that you've seen in the papers with the Wayne County Mediation Tribunal, which is a well-recognized process, to adopt into what is I think otherwise sort of a typical -- at least in our experience, typical kind of ADR process we've used, so it was never really intended to be used for every

kind of claim in the case. We did reserve the right, which we thought was appropriate, in our discretion and have some flexibility to use it if -- this process for other kinds of claims, but we had a number of objections from people saying, "My claim doesn't really fit in this. Can you confirm it doesn't fit in this?" And so we have in the revised form of order -- and we revised it one time since what your Honor has seen -- excluded the pension claims, the post-employment benefit claims, the retiree healthcare, for example, laborrelated grievances, workers' compensation claims, the certificate of participation-related claims. The one we've added is the general obligation bond debt, and the U.S. government asked us if we'd exclude their claims, which we Obviously we were never intending to put in claims that were already in mediation and other procedures, so that series of exclusions resolves the -- my understanding, the Retirement Systems' objection, AFSCME's objection, U.S. government's objection, FGIC, ATU, and Ambac, so that puts aside -- one, two, three, four, five -- six right there. Then it gets a little more complicated, I would say,

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Then it gets a little more complicated, I would say because we have agreements in principle to resolve Mr.

Goodman's objection for Ryan, to the extent it's still pending because he's moved to substitute a different party, and the public safety unions' objections. We have had trouble getting the language in a place where people all

agreed to it, but let me explain to you what we tried to achieve, which we'd be willing to do based on an order of the Court, whether anyone else agreed to it, as long as your Honor agreed to it, but the public safety unions' concern, your Honor, is about the types of claims that are filed that involve their members, what we called multi-party claims, I think, in the procedures order. And often the city is sued, and the members are sued as co-defendants. If we put in the claim that's been asserted against the city into ADR, what happens to their indemnification claim, their defense and all that? And we said it's a very fair point. Really these should go together into the process. Everyone who's involved is in the process, so we designed a revision to the procedures to make sure they got to be in the process. would get ADR notices at the same time. Hopefully everything would be resolved together. If it doesn't get resolved and people don't agree to go to arbitration, then it'll get litigated presumably. And if that happens, you know, the union members are subject to your Honor's extended stay, so we gave them the right at the end of ADR if there's no resolution to come in and argue the stay should stay in place even though the ADR procedures might say it would go away. That seemed fair to us. And we think in principle that resolves the union's concerns, and I think on that issue it probably does, and Ms. Patek can explain if it does or not.

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The more complicated issue was the Ryan matter, which your Honor I know is familiar with because it's been before the Court before. And there was an actual -- there was litigation over preventing the stay from being lifted, and you'll see in our proposal what we're asking the Court to do is, in fact, lift the stay on this matter, which is a somewhat dramatic change of position, but it's consistent with paragraph 9 of the ADR procedures which allows the city to look at claims and in unique or appropriate circumstances decide this is not a case that's going to settle likely and it won't benefit from ADR. We're going to take it right -- just lift the stay and let it go be litigated.

And for Ryan, although we had litigated about lifting the stay previously, in the context of having a program in place where the city understands how it can manage the cases going through the system, it does feel comfortable lifting the stay for this matter. I was very concerned when it didn't have a program, but now it -- you know, we've talked about it quite a bit, and we've worked very closely with the city's law department, and Ed Keelean, the deputy corporation counsel, is here today as well, and so we've talked about how this would work, and they're very comfortable with this in this context. So I think that's sort of easy. We would stipulate to lift the stay, and it's consistent with the procedures if your Honor approves the

procedures. The complicated part and the resolution of it was that there are two members of the public safety union who are codefendants, so we had to work out something with the union about that. And what we did is effectively agree that -- which is already in our procedures anyway -- we agreed to confirm specifically that lifting the stay is only to liquidate the claims. It's not about collection. that's true for the public service union members as well because they're subject to a stay, so if there was a desire to collect at the end of a judgment having been achieved, they would have to come back -- the plaintiff would come back here and ask your Honor to lift the stay as we confirm that lifting the stay for now is only to liquidate the amounts, and otherwise the stay would be in place. We confirm that. We also confirm that the city will continue to defend the two members of the union who are in this lawsuit with only a couple of caveats. One is that the defense is conditioned on the cooperation of these defendants. That's part of the way this works. They have to -- if they don't cooperate, they don't show up, they don't necessarily get defended. And the same thing with indemnification. They will have a right to seek an indemnification claim but, again, only if they cooperate, and I quess for both defense and indemnity only if they don't testify in a way that demonstrates that they were not acting in the good faith performance of their duties.

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This is just the standard that applies to these kinds of
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     cases, so -- but we did give some, I think, significant
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     assurances that absent those things where defense and
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     indemnity go away by their nature, we will defend and they
    will have an indemnity claim. How the claim gets treated --
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              THE COURT: Suppose there's a dispute as between the
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     individual employee and the city about whether there was that
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     kind of cooperation.
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              MR. ELLMAN: Well, that would have to be
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     adjudicated. I don't know where that would be adjudicated.
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     That may be something that --
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              THE COURT: Where would it be adjudicated if it
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    weren't for the bankruptcy?
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              MR. ELLMAN: If I could ask Mr. Keelean that
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     question, I would appreciate it, your Honor.
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              MR. KEELEAN: It would be resolved by grievance
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     through arbitration.
              MR. ELLMAN: Grievance in arbitration.
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              THE COURT: So does this agreement change that?
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              MR. ELLMAN: Absolutely nothing --
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              THE COURT: For example, does it put me in charge of
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     that decision?
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              MR. ELLMAN: We're not intending to change anything
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     about that process whatsoever, your Honor.
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THE COURT: Are you willing to specify that in the

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order?

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MR. ELLMAN: I would certainly be. I presume that that's okay with my client, and he says yes.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. ELLMAN: Yes, we would be perfectly fine with that. We were not intending to change any of that. And also it says in our draft stipulation we put together lifting the stay the individual members have the right to hire their own counsel as well if they would like to. Obviously true. that's where we stand, so we have sort of an agreement in principle between the unions and Ryan on that, but getting the details, especially on the union piece of this, has been challenging. Now, of course, this morning the Ryan objection was -- there's a motion to replace Ryan and have a different party than the objecting party, which we obviously -- maybe it's not obvious, but we disagree with that motion. We would oppose that motion. We would not -- I think the plaintiff in the other matter that Mr. Goodman has is named Swift. don't know anything really about this case, but I talked briefly with Mr. Keelean in advance of the hearing, and although it may have some similarities to Ryan in the nature of the kinds of relief being sought, we would not agree that this is a -- that was an appropriate case to go right into litigation without the ADR procedure, so we'd oppose the motion to substitute on whatever grounds it really states,

which I haven't really studied, and on the merits we would oppose, you know, whatever it says about the ADR process for all the same reasons we were defending the process for everyone else, so that's where we stand with Ryan, this new party, Swift, and with the public safety unions, and then there are two --

THE COURT: Well, but in regard to your concession regarding Ryan --

MR. ELLMAN: Um-hmm.

THE COURT: -- why agree to allow that case to bypass ADR, if I can phrase it that way, and not all the other 1983 actions pending in this District Court?

MR. ELLMAN: Well, I mean I think the answer, your Honor, is the city will look at these on their merits and determine which of these causes of action will benefit from the ADR process based on our discussions with Mr. Goodman and his client to date, based on evaluating the type of action, the facts, the likelihood of settlement. You know, it's a -- it's like a business judgment-type test.

THE COURT: So you want the opportunity to do that for all the other 1983 actions. Is that what you're saying?

MR. ELLMAN: Yes, because they're all unique, and the way the process was put in place is that everyone -- and we've committed all the tort -- personal injury tort, all these kinds of litigation cases go into ADR. We will

designate them all into it, but we gave ourselves an escape hatch because we know that we don't want to waste our time and everyone else's time. If it looks to us like it's not really going to be beneficial, we will not do that. And, of course, the procedures are very flexible. If we start the process and we begin the first offer exchange procedure and it looks like this is going nowhere, we have the ability by agreement to just move this off into litigation, so we want a process that's efficient. We believe -- I know the city very much believes that this -- the offer exchange and the Wayne County MTA process will be very successful in resolving a number of claims, and they've been doing this for a long time. And Mr. Keelean and his team have a very good sense of what makes sense, and they're going to be managing this in the legal department for the most part, so the process needs to be a procedure that's going to deal with a lot of claims that they have to feel comfortable with their staff that they can deal with, and they're going to make sure that they feel comfortable that what they do is going to be in the best interest of the process.

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THE COURT: Your proposal includes a bar against filing motions for relief from the stay.

MR. ELLMAN: During a period of time, yes, it does. That has the effect of giving the city

the first and really only call on whether ADR will work or

THE COURT:

not; right?

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MR. ELLMAN: That is correct, and the idea is that the debtor is responsible for managing this process, and the debtor is the focal point of what we project to be certainly over a thousand claims that we've committed will go into ADR. And we've given ourselves --

THE COURT: Well, but if a particular plaintiff and obviously their lawyer believes that ADR won't work, why not give them an opportunity to try to persuade the Court that that's the case?

MR. ELLMAN: Well, we certainly -- there's no reason you couldn't do that, but our view is that that would be extremely inefficient. It would be a burden. That would eliminate or mitigate a lot of the benefit we see in this program to take some of the relief from the docket off of the Court and to push people into a process that we think can be managed. If we're still coming into court every day talking about whether people should be in ADR, I think it's problematic, and we really didn't have that many objections. We did serve every party we know who has sued us and everyone who's made a demand on us who might sue us or indicated they might sue us. It's about 1,800. They may not be unique There may be a lot of overlap, but 1,800 people on the list, and we did not get a lot of responses at the end of the day, and certainly most the responses were people like

the, you know, Retirement Systems --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. ELLMAN: -- and unions dealing with other issues. We understand -- and I don't practice in this jurisdiction for these types of cases, but the Wayne County MTA process works pretty well is my understanding, and people understand it and have used it, and so even if we didn't do this, you know, a court could just send -- your Honor or a District Court judge could send someone to this process, so it doesn't seem to us to be an unfair thing to do, and that -- you know, that could happen in any case, so we think this is the best way to manage it.

Now, there are two other objections I didn't mention just very briefly. One was by a gentleman, Jeffrey Sanders, who's a pro se party, filed a case in 2007 having to do with -- he was arrested for domestic violence charges, and he asserts some constitutional violations based on that arrest is my understanding. I couldn't perceive in his filing really a basis to challenge the ADR procedure, so we would ask for that to be overruled, which we note in our papers.

And then we have Lasalle Town Houses Cooperative Association, and there are some -- a couple of other plaintiffs we've called the cooperatives. That one -- there's some indication, based on discussions before the hearing, that perhaps this is -- our proposal may be

acceptable to the cooperatives, and counsel can address that. This is a punitive class action dealing with the rates that the water department charges to these residential units, which they treat as commercial buildings because they're multi-unit facilities. Just to cut to the chase as to what we're proposing, they filed also a lift stay motion to proceed to get a judgment on pre-petition claims, postpetition claims, and an injunction about the way rates are charged in the future. The ADR process is not set up to deal with injunctive relief. It wasn't for that purpose. this is a case that's largely about money damages or at least substantially about money damages, and we believe the ADR process would be useful. And, of course, in the context of discussions in an ADR process, the city and the plaintiffs can agree to other kinds of relief as well, and we think sitting down and having that discussion would be useful. we have proposed that this would go into the ADR process. We're prepared to put it in, you know, early in the process, we said within 30 days of the bar date, get the process started quickly. At the end of that process, we have committed that the stay will be lifted if there's no resolution and if it doesn't go to arbitration, which I don't think it will, and the stay will be lifted. They will get their stay relief. The only thing we're asking in exchange for that is that they do attempt to talk to us about

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resolution to this process. From talking to counsel just before the hearing, it sounds like perhaps that might be acceptable. They were thinking about it still. That's where we are with that objection. That covers all the objections, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. ELLMAN: And if you have any other questions, I'd be happy to answer them.

THE COURT: No.

MR. ELLMAN: Thank you.

MS. PATEK: Good morning, your Honor. Barbara Patek on behalf of the Detroit public safety unions. Much of what Mr. Ellman said is correct. We have -- but we do have some unresolved issues. A big one, I think, was addressed by the Court, that as long as the order suggests that if there is a dispute on indemnification that the ordinary course grievance arbitration procedure would kick in would resolve a lot of our issues.

We have the following that we raised in our objection. One is since we filed and sought an extension of the stay to former public safety union members, we've been trying to get from the city -- and we understand the difficulties the city has sometimes with compiling this information -- a list of the known claims in which current or former public safety union members have been named as the

defendants, and we -- to the extent that the Court is overruling any part of our objection, we want it clear that it's not overruling our right to seek that information and to continue to seek that information because it'll be important not only to the ADR process but to our ability to file claims on behalf of those individuals.

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The indemnification claims -- and this is where I think there may need and we -- I was working over the weekend with the city, and we just didn't quite get there. There are a couple of different buckets. First of all, throughout the order, it should indicate where it says "public safety union members," it should be "current or former public safety union members" because some of these folks are no longer employed, and, in fact, some of them are leaving their city employment just because of the difficulty of the circumstances of continuing to work there.

We've got cases -- and I believe, as I read their order, the only cases that are going to be submitted to ADR are cases in which the city is a co-defendant. There are some cases where the city is not named as a defendant. For example, there's a lift stay motion on the Fulgenzi, Headapohl case, and so we want it clear that those cases, as I understand it, will not be going through these ADR procedures but will be dealt with in the ordinary course.

There are also, to my understanding, a category of

Section 19 --

THE COURT: When you say "dealt with in the ordinary course," they're stayed until the Court grants relief from the stay.

MS. PATEK: Correct, and through the labor --

THE COURT: That's what you mean.

MS. PATEK: And they are -- and Mr. Moore, who is the DPOA's labor counsel, is here in the courtroom today because I'm not intimately familiar with that process, but my understanding is through the mediation and in the ordinary course, labor grievances are proceeding, and these indemnification claims -- it's a little bit tricky because they're carving out grievances, but these kind of will fall into two buckets here, and we just want to --

THE COURT: Right.

MS. PATEK: -- make sure nothing happens that prejudices us. Also, to the extent -- and this was raised, and my understanding is I'm not -- I think the city is opposing this, but to the extent that any of these --

THE COURT: Wait. Let's wind the clock back a little bit here because I want to be sure I get this right with you. If there's a dispute between an individual and the city in a case where the city is not a codefendant --

MS. PATEK: Correct.

THE COURT: -- about whether the city will indemnify

and defend that individual in that case, the stay prohibits any legal action by the individual against the city to get that issue resolved. Yes?

MS. PATEK: You're talking about the individual public safety union member.

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. PATEK: Except to the extent that -- and, again, I will let Mr. Moore, if the Court would allow it, address that. I believe that a mechanism is being worked out either through the mediation process or otherwise where these issues are being addressed, and I think the city has proposed to address them in the ordinary course.

THE COURT: Okay. And will that resolution be a part of this order? Is that what you're contemplating, or something else?

MS. PATEK: That resolution will not be a part of this order, but we want to make it clear that this order is not addressing the merits of that. We want to carve it out so that our -- what we're seeking to --

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. PATEK: -- do is to preserve our rights here.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. PATEK: And the way these indemnification claims arise, sometimes right out the door the city knows -- and I think there may be only a small handful of these --

1 THE COURT: Right.

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MS. PATEK: We don't think we have a defense and indemnification obligation, and there's a grievance. Sometimes as the case proceeds and through the process, the city may determine we think we may not have an obligation to indemnify, so we don't know when that --

THE COURT: Um-hmm.

MS. PATEK: -- is going to arise. And so that's why --

THE COURT: Um-hmm, of course.

MS. PATEK: -- we're trying to get our arms around what's out there and work with the city to try to figure out a resolution for that.

And the last thing is to the extent because as the collective bargaining agreements have provided and as has historically, to my understanding, been the case, it has been the city's obligation to provide a defense to the extent any of these claims is peeled off and put into ADR. If there is not going to be a unified defense in that case, we would ask that the city through the ADR procedures pay the cost of defense for the current or former public safety union member who is part of that process, so --

THE COURT: And that's something that's done in the ordinary course outside of bankruptcy?

MS. PATEK: In the ordinary course -- and, again, I

will let Mr. Moore or perhaps Mr. Goodman, who is on the other side of these cases, address it, but my understanding is in the ordinary course, the city is defending these cases generally through corporation counsel, on occasion through outside counsel. There is generally a unified defense that's provided, and then at some point, either after judgment or along the process, a determination is made, and once the case is resolved, typically, in the absence of some kind of final -- in the absence of a final adjudication, that there's no indemnification obligation, these individuals are indemnified, and so that's --

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. PATEK: That's my understanding of how that works.

THE COURT: So you want to preserve those issues.

MS. PATEK: Correct; correct. And we're prepared -and we've been working with the city to continue to work with
the city, and I understand, you know, the concerns about
pace. With the Ryan motion, I think that we are generally in
agreement, especially with the -- you know, on the issue of
good faith, the indemnification obligation, as long as our
rights are preserved to protect that and that we're not
handing the decision on whether or not there's an
indemnification obligation over to the city, I think we are
comfortable --

1 THE COURT: Okay.

MS. PATEK: -- with that case proceeding. And the last little -- on the Ryan motion, there was an order. They talked about collection. We would like no kind of proceeding supplementary to judgment at all until further order of this Court against the particular public safety union member who might be affected.

THE COURT: So by that you mean not even like a creditors' examination?

MS. PATEK: Correct. I think these folks have enough to deal with at this point.

MR. GOODMAN: Good morning, your Honor. Much of what has been said does not address the interests or concerns of Deborah Ryan. However, I would just like to clarify something that Mr. Ellman said that I think was somewhat confusing, which is that this morning we filed a motion. We did, indeed, file a motion, but it was not a motion to substitute Walter Swift, another action, in the underlying Ryan motion to set aside the stay. It was a motion to substitute Mr. Swift as an objector to the city's --

MR. GOODMAN: -- ADR plan. I don't know if the

THE COURT: Right.

MR. GOODMAN: -- ADR plan. I don't know if the Court has had a chance to see that motion.

THE COURT: Would you put your appearance on the record?

MR. GOODMAN: William Goodman on behalf of Deborah Ryan. I apologize, your Honor. So, as I said, I do not know whether the Court has had an opportunity to see --

THE COURT: I did. I read it.

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MR. GOODMAN: Oh, good. And I did not know that Mr. Keelean would be here. I served counsel with paper copies of the motion and the exhibit, and I will give Mr. Keelean a copy at the end of this motion this morning. But at any rate, the main point there is that while we are in agreement in principle with the proposed order that -- with regard to the Ryan case that was presented this morning to the Court, we do want to urge the Court to consider that -- the systemic issues that were raised in Ms. Ryan's objections and for that specifically with regard to the ADR process, and paragraphs 7(a) through 7(g) of the proposed Swift objections identify those as well. And the reason that this is being brought belatedly -- and I concede that -- is because the issue of the debtor -- the City of Detroit has done a 180 essentially on the question of whether or not they were going to stipulate to our motion to set aside, and both Ms. Ryan and other -- Mr. Swift, for example, who was relying upon those objections as they might relate to his case and so many others, was somewhat taken by surprise by that, so that's by way of an apologia. Now, you know --

THE COURT: Well, but Mr. Swift, through counsel,

did have an opportunity to timely object. Yes?

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MR. GOODMAN: I concede that, and he did not timely object. I concede that as well. However, as I said, the issues which he would have raised and does raise had already been raised by Ms. Ryan, and there was no reason to anticipate or expect that that would -- that essentially that rug would be pulled out from under him, and -- but I concede that it's late. Other than that, I have nothing to say. I'll answer any questions that the Court may wish to pose at this time.

THE COURT: Well, I guess I'm interested in your response to the city's concern that to carve out a class of cases that assert constitutional claims from the ADR procedure denies it and, therefore, the other creditors in the case the benefit of the efficiency that's built into it, and there are, of course, also other administrative issues. How does one decide whether one -- whether a particular case is one that should be carved out if we were to create an exception as opposed to one that shouldn't be carved out if there is such an exception?

MR. GOODMAN: Understood. Keep -- I would like to emphasize for the Court and for counsel in this matter that Ms. Ryan's objections and now Mr. Swift's objections to the proceedings, as it relates to them, are essentially objections with regard to the fine-tuning of the plan and not

necessarily an objection with regard to the applicability of any ADR process to any Section 1983 case.

THE COURT: Okay. So what fine-tuning would you propose?

MR. GOODMAN: I would propose that there be a separate form of mediative or facilitative process with regard to Section 1983 cases involving persons with some more direct experience, knowledge, and skill in these areas than one finds routinely over at the Wayne County Mediation Tribunal with which I'm also quite familiar.

THE COURT: So who or what would that be?

MR. GOODMAN: I'm sorry.

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THE COURT: Who or what would that be?

MR. GOODMAN: That would be subject to a process of identification, selection of skillful practitioners, defense and plaintiff's practitioners in this area. I am sure -- confident I could sit down with Mr. Keelean and -- over a process of a couple days and provide a list of 50 to a hundred such lawyers for the Court --

THE COURT: Um-hmm.

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$ GOODMAN: -- and others as well. They don't have to be lawyers, by the way.

THE COURT: So your primary objection is that the personnel and the procedures of the ADR system in the Wayne County Mediation Tribunal are not suited to these kinds of

claims?

MR. GOODMAN: That's one of the objections. Another objection goes to the availability of both attorneys' fees and punitive damages, which are excluded from the current proposed ADR plan, and which are built into the constitutional protection, as I understand the law on jurisprudence in this area, and to deprive it is a constitutional violation, I would say, and, therefore, that would have to be readjusted and modified to some degree.

THE COURT: Those two?

MR. GOODMAN: Those are the two that I can think of.

There may be others --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GOODMAN: -- spelled out in the objections as well that have --

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. GOODMAN: -- slipped my mind.

THE COURT: Anyone else want to be heard on this?

MR. ROMANO: Your Honor, we'd like to be heard.

THE COURT: Step forward, sir.

MR. ROMANO: Good morning, your Honor. Dan Romano on behalf of a whole host of plaintiffs. We filed an objection with the Court listing about 91 plaintiffs we represent in different causes of action. Some of the plaintiffs are in 1983 actions, and some of the concerns we

have have been raised by Mr. Goodman. However, we see there being an inherent problem with the process for a number of other reasons. The list of litigants that we were given by the city includes people that are — this could be cleared up — includes people that have already been dismissed and settled like a year, two years ago. It also includes lists of people that have already been through ADR processes and are actually either in the process, were in the process of setting hearings, actually having hearings at arbitrations, and then those were stayed. They also involve people that have settled their claims and are waiting for distributions after exchanging releases. They also include the people that —

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THE COURT: What's the problem with all this?

MR. ROMANO: Well, the problem with all that is how can -- are those going to all go through again the process?

THE COURT: Why do you think they would?

MR. ROMANO: Because there's no clarification in the process in the order that was submitted by the city that those are treated differently, and when they gave the list of people that were included in this process, it didn't say that those people were excluded from it. And I don't know how those people are going to be dealt with either, your Honor, because there's issues also with when -- as Mr. Goodman talked about, the difference between individual claims and

claims against the city. At the end of the day when there's a number put on that claim for an individual person, if there's a discharge for the city, will there be a discharge for the individual? I mean I --

THE COURT: Why does that matter?

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MR. ROMANO: -- don't know because the process --

THE COURT: Why does that matter?

MR. ROMANO: Because -- it matters a lot, your Honor, because if there's a discharge for the city, then we can -- and there's not a discharge for the individual, we can go after the individual claims still so my clients will be compensated.

THE COURT: Only after the stay is lifted.

MR. ROMANO: Correct. But it doesn't indicate that -- I think the language in the order that was presented by the --

THE COURT: That's a plan question, not an ADR question, isn't it?

MR. ROMANO: Well, not really because I think the ADR -- the order that was presented was that the final findings of any of these processes was to put a -- set a value for discharge, so if it's setting a value for discharge for even individuals that may then ultimately be collectible, that's sort of an unnecessary process. Also, it seems to include -- it seems to include us in a process that incurs

much more expense for things that have already transpired in many cases, and also what's the difference between this process for individual claimants and the process for filing a proof of claim when either is subject to discharge? We have to consider the expenses to our clients and to ourselves for going through this process.

THE COURT: The proof of claim is required regardless; right?

MR. ROMANO: Yes, but the proof of claim preserves the right just like this process would have. It's just about getting a value for discharge. And all that does is make my clients put a lot more money forward for no reason.

THE COURT: Why?

MR. ROMANO: Because we have to go through a process in some cases where we've already been through it, and, secondly, when we have to go through a process to get a value --

THE COURT: Oh, that's what you were talking about before.

MR. ROMANO: Yes.

THE COURT: But the proof of claim is something the Bankruptcy Code requires. There's nothing I can do about that.

MR. ROMANO: No. I'm not asking you to do that, your Honor. I'm saying that this is redundant to the proof

of claim by the way the order says the relief given is. The relief is to discharge the claims, to set a value for discharge. What's the difference other than extra cost to the plaintiffs versus filing a proof of claim?

THE COURT: Well, but isn't the answer to that simply that under the Bankruptcy Code this Court doesn't have the jurisdiction to fix the claims for personal injury or wrongful death, so they've got to be tried somewhere else regardless?

MR. ROMANO: Well, your Honor, in these particular claims, there's issues again with not just -- we talked about the 1983 claims, but there's also the issues with the individual claims versus the city for motor vehicle ownership as well, a number of issues. Number one is the city is a self-insured entity. There's PIP claims, which if they reach an end and they're discharged, what -- it doesn't talk about in the ADR whether those are going to be taken over by another entity, whether they're collectible through the Michigan Property Guaranty Association, whether there's discharge for the individuals in those cases, too, like if they're driving a city-owned vehicle.

THE COURT: So you're raising discharge issues that I can't deal with now. These are plan questions.

MR. ROMANO: Well, they're also -- this process, though --

1 THE COURT: Just to give you a number. 2 MR. ROMANO: Well, why is that any different than the number that we would place in a proof of claim without 3 4 this process? 5 THE COURT: It's not. MR. ROMANO: So why should the plaintiff incur extra 6 7 expense? THE COURT: It's a way to fix the amount of the 8 9 claim. 10 MR. ROMANO: Right. 11 THE COURT: What the consequence of that amount is 12 either for the city or for other parties is a plan question, and I think the order is crystal clear about that. 13 14 MR. ROMANO: Well, what about fixing the problem with these claims that have already been through the process 15 16 or are waiting in different steps in the process --17 THE COURT: That's a good question. That's a good 18 question. 19 MR. ROMANO: -- and the claims that have already 20 been settled? Are those supposed to --21 THE COURT: Right. 22 MR. ROMANO: -- be going through this process? 23 THE COURT: That's another good guestion. 24 MR. ROMANO: There's a --25 THE COURT: Any other good questions?

MR. ROMANO: I don't think so, not according to the Court.

THE COURT: Let's see what the answers are, you know, because those are --

MR. ROMANO: Right.

THE COURT: You know, we don't -- I'm sure nobody wants to, you know, duplicate effort, so let's just get it clarified.

MR. ROMANO: Okay. Thanks, your Honor.

THE COURT: Anyone else want to speak? Step forward, please, sir.

MR. SANDERS: Good morning, Judge. My name is Jeffrey Sanders. I've been a designated creditor in this particular case, and I'd just like to represent that I believe that approving this motion for this alternative dispute resolution basically condones criminal oversight in and of itself insofar as I guess the City of Detroit would aspire to basically depart from the mandates of the law itself and employ some other process or method, which basically violates, I guess, the mandates of, you know, due process and equal protection of law and so on and so forth.

THE COURT: You know, that's such an interesting issue that's -- you know, it's been debated for as long as we've had alternative dispute resolution. Ultimately, however, if any particular party like yourself wants the

- legal process invoked for a trial with a jury and all of that, to the extent the party is entitled to it, they get it. They get it. Is that what you want?
 - MR. SANDERS: Actually, what I want -- I believe what I want -- personally, I want this thing to be addressed and resolved and adjudicated in a lawful manner --

THE COURT: Yeah.

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MR. SANDERS: -- and -- as opposed to --

THE COURT: Well, you're entitled to that, and there's nothing in this that will deprive you of that.

MR. SANDERS: An alternative dispute resolution?

THE COURT: It's just a way to see if the case can be settled. If it can't be settled, you get your full legal rights.

MR. SANDERS: Okay. So in the event that the City of Detroit, they just refuse to settle, they refuse to acknowledge a claim, they refuse to refute it, they just refuse overall to resolve it --

THE COURT: They're entitled to do that just like you're entitled to pursue your claim.

MR. SANDERS: And so if it has criminal implications that are made known to the Court, then what?

THE COURT: That's not a question I can answer because this is not a criminal court. This is a Bankruptcy Court.

1 MR. SANDERS: Okay.

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THE COURT: Criminal issues get resolved somewhere else, thank you. Anyone else want to be heard? Sir?

MR. ELLMAN: Your Honor, Jeffrey Ellman from Jones Day on behalf of the city again. I'd be happy to answer -- address a couple of the points that were raised if that's helpful to the Court.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. ELLMAN: The last -- the person prior to the last objector in the red tie -- I don't know his name.

THE COURT: Mr. Romano?

MR. ELLMAN: What's that?

THE COURT: Mr. Romano?

MR. ELLMAN: Mr. Romano. Thank you. I'm not sure which party he represents, but he raised a couple points. I just wanted to answer how they would be addressed. As far as parties who have been through the process before, we tried to address this to some extent, and it's in a footnote in our procedures. If you've been through case evaluation before, you've been through this mediation process, case evaluation process, it's not going to happen again unless the parties agree that it's a good idea to try it again, so in that case what would happen is you'd have offer exchange. We'd make an offer. It could be as fast as the party says no, and it's over, or there could be a discussion and a -- and a

settlement discussion out of that offer exchange process, but we would not do the case evaluation again if it's been done unless the parties both agreed that it was a useful thing to do. As far as -- I guess that was maybe the main --

THE COURT: What footnote is that?

MR. ELLMAN: It's Footnote 6, and I have an updated draft. I think it's probably Footnote 6 in what you have as well, and it's in Section -- it's at Roman numeral II, capital B, case evaluation. It's the first footnote in that section that refers to that. We certainly don't want to waste people's time doing something that's been done, although we don't believe this is a highly expensive process.

Mr. Goodman raised a couple of points I can address, and I'll do them in reverse order. He made a point about no attorneys' fees being permitted and certain other kinds of claims not being permitted in this process. That is in our order -- or in our procedures but only as to arbitration, binding arbitration, which is totally voluntary. If he doesn't like those procedures, he doesn't have to agree to them. We have updated the order -- or excuse me -- the procedures to make clear that the parties can agree to include all those things if they want to, so it's -- make it a flexible process. The parties could agree to include everything, have a fight about attorney' fees and everything else, but --

THE COURT: So a party that's seeking punitive damages need only opt out of arbitration?

MR. ELLMAN: Well, just not agree to it. Everyone has opted out until they agree to be in, so there's no automatic way into arbitration. You have to agree to it. Both parties have --

THE COURT: If they opt in, they waive their punitive damage claim.

MR. ELLMAN: Or we will have to agree to some other approach to it because we could agree with them that we will include that in the process, so it's a streamlined process. That's by agreement, so -- and that includes the city. The city doesn't have to agree to arbitration either. The city can say, no, thank you, to arbitration, so that's that point.

As far as having a separate process separate and apart from the MTA process for certain kinds of claims, we really tried to avoid that because we're going for simplicity here, something that's easy to administer and user friendly. My understanding is that these types of constitutional claims do go to the MTA and that they have skilled practitioners. Not every one of the courts necessarily sends every one of these claims to that process, but they have been sent to that process and have been dealt with successfully.

THE COURT: Well, but simplicity has to be balanced against effectiveness.

MR. ELLMAN: It does, but my understanding, as I said before, the city's view is that this process has been extremely effective in reaching settlements, including of these types of claims. That's their experience in this process. The very high majority of cases that go to the Wayne County Tribunal get settled, and so they see no reason --

THE COURT: Including 1983 actions?

MR. ELLMAN: That is my understanding, yes.

THE COURT: Do you have any objection if I check with my chief district judge on that point?

MR. ELLMAN: I certainly have no objection to that whatsoever.

MR. GOODMAN: I'd just like to say that I'm going -Mr. Romano has a much larger caseload of 1983 cases than we
do. We're a small law firm. However, my experience has been
I've never served in that capacity in the Wayne County
Mediation Tribunal, and I've never been before it because
routinely when one asserts a Section 1983 claim and brings it
in Wayne County Circuit Court, the City of Detroit removes
that claim to federal court, and while some federal cases get
sent to the Wayne County Mediation Tribunal, very few do. My
experience is that none of ours have ever had that happen.

THE COURT: My question to you, Mr. Goodman, was do

you have any objection if I check with my chief district judge regarding the effectiveness of the Wayne County Mediation Tribunal in 1983 actions?

MR. GOODMAN: I not only have no objection, I would highly recommend and urge the Court to do so.

THE COURT: Mr. Romano, do you have any objection if I do that?

MR. ROMANO: No, your Honor, but I think the Court has to understand that in 1983 it's only -- we only go to case evaluations by agreement -- it's not mandatory if it's filed in federal court -- and also, your Honor, that as far as other cases, you can check with the tribunal, but any other tort cases I think the success rate of Michigan mediation or case evaluation as it's called now is about 16 percent of mutual acceptance, and that's high, the higher counties. Wayne might be lower, so I don't think that's really accurate as far as its effectiveness.

MR. ELLMAN: Well, I'd just confirm with my client their view of this being highly effective, and I'll just for one additional -- I don't know how you measure statistics in different ways, but from the city's experience this process has been effective to both settle claims directly through the process or also to establish a basis for a later settlement. Many of these cases settle later. It's because of what happened in that process. It may not have settled at the

process.

THE COURT: Yeah. Measuring success of mediation programs is a very tricky and slippery business because if you just look at what settles that day, you're going to get one number, but if you look at what settles a month later because of that process, you're going to get a much bigger number, so -- all right. Since I have your consent, I will consult with Chief Judge Rosen on the effectiveness of the Michigan Tribunal -- the Mediation Tribunal for 1983 actions. If it doesn't appear to the Court that that is an effective process, I may come back to you to design one from scratch for this case, so that part of this process may have to be delayed a bit.

MR. ELLMAN: We understand, your Honor.

THE COURT: Did you want to address Ms. Patek's concerns?

MR. ELLMAN: Yes. I have a -- a few of the points that she made I can try to address. As far as receiving information as one of her concerns, we have provided what I understand is the information we have about the pending cases that involve her members that we know of. We're certainly happy to continue to provide that information and cooperate with them. I'm not sure it has anything to do with a provision of the ADR order or procedures, but we certainly have committed to working with her on that.

With respect to cases that have been filed only against her members or the union's members and not against the city, I'm not sure exactly what she's asking for. It sounds like those were outside of the scope of this order as well, and they'll be dealt with in the normal course.

THE COURT: No. If I understood her correctly, what she wants is a specific understanding, maybe even explicitly in the order, that nothing in the order impacts the substantive or procedural rights of her -- of the individuals to pursue their claim against the city for indemnification or defense in the ordinary course.

MR. ELLMAN: I think all that is fine, your Honor.

One thing we don't agree with, and we've traded some

language, as Ms. Patek indicated, I don't think this order is

a place to say the city will defend these parties or will

indemnify them.

THE COURT: And I agree with that. This is a procedures order.

MR. ELLMAN: One is going to be unique, and I agree that it'll be dealt with in the normal course on their merits and the way they're dealt with, so to that extent, I think we're in agreement. I personally don't believe and haven't believed it needed to be something stated in the order, but if the Court --

THE COURT: I think it's better --

MR. ELLMAN: -- disagrees --1 2 THE COURT: I think it's better if it is, so I'm 3 going to ask the two of you to consult with each other on 4 some language --MR. ELLMAN: We'll do that. 5 6 THE COURT: -- that addresses Ms. Patek's concerns, 7 and if you can't agree, get me on the phone, and I'll help 8 you. 9 MR. ELLMAN: Yes. And I think the last point that I 10 had in my notes that she raised about the no supplemental --11 supplementary proceedings post-judgment, I assume that's 12 something we can work out --1.3 THE COURT: Please. 14 MR. ELLMAN: -- as far as language. That's not a -that's not an issue for us. 15 16 THE COURT: Okay. 17 MR. ELLMAN: I think that covers issues I had written down unless the Court has questions. 18 That's it. 19 THE COURT: No. 20 MR. ELLMAN: Thank you. 2.1 THE COURT: All right. So let me ask you to submit 22 a revised order after you've had a chance to discuss this 23 further with Ms. Patek. In the meantime, I'm going to 24 consult with Chief Judge Rosen on the issue of the 1983

actions, and if I decide that needs to be carved out of this,

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I will effectuate that. If I decided that there's no basis 2 to carve them out, then I'll consider the city's order. 3 MR. GOODMAN: Your Honor, I take it --THE COURT: Stand by the microphone for me. 5 MR. GOODMAN: William Goodman again. I take it, your Honor, that the Court is then going to enter an order 6 setting aside the stay with regard to Ms. Ryan's case and --THE COURT: Yes. You may submit a stipulation and 8 9 order to do that. MR. GOODMAN: -- and that I may so advise Judge 10 11 Goldsmith, who is quite interested in that issue. 12 THE COURT: If you feel like that's something you 13 need to do, you may tell him it is forthcoming. 14 MR. GOODMAN: Thank you. THE COURT: Okay. Anything else on this morning's 15 Okay. We'll be in recess until 2:30. 16 docket? 17 THE CLERK: All rise. Court is in recess. 18 (Proceedings concluded at 11:24 a.m.)

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WITNESSES:

None

EXHIBITS:

None

I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the sound recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter.

/s/ Lois Garrett

December 18, 2013

Lois Garrett